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RECENT CASE NOTES
ALIENs-ExEMPTION OF NoN-DEcLARANT ALIENS FROM DRAFT-STATUTORY
CONSTRtcTI oN-AmINiSTRATIvE LAw.-The petitioner, a non-declarant alien,
having failed to file his claim for exemption under the Selective Draft Act
within the time allowed by the regulations, was certified for military service by
a local draft board, and sued out a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground of
alienage, to obtain his release from military custody. Held, (I) that the writ
would issue, the petitioner being absolutely excluded from service under the
Act and not merely conditionally subject to exemption; and (2) that as the
draft board, an administrative board with quasi-judicial functions, had acted in
excess of its jurisdiction, its decision was void. Ex parte Beck (1917, D. Mont.)
245 Fed. 967. Contra, on the first point, United States v. Finley (1917, S. D.
N. Y.) 245 Fed. 871; Er parte Hutflis (19r7, W. D. N. Y.) 245 Fed. 798.
The complainant, alleging that he was a non-declarant alien, asked an injunc-
tion restraining the military authorities from certifying him for military service,
the local and district boards having found on the facts adversely to his claim
of alienage. Held, that in the absence of a denial of due process in the hear-
ing of his claim for exemption, the finding of the district board was final.
Angelus v. Sullivan (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 246 Fed. 54. See COMMENTS, p. 683.
BILLS AND NoTEs-NoTE SIGNED IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY-EFFECr OF
DISCLOSING PaiNcIPAL.-The trustees of a church gave a note to A, reading "we
promise to pay," etc., and signed by the trustees in their own names, with the
words "trustees A. M. E. Zion Church" after their signatures. The note was
endorsed in blank by A. The plaintiff, a subsequent holder, sued both the church
and the trustees as individuals. Held, that under section 20 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, since the principal was disclosed, the note was on its face
the obligation of the church, and the individual defendants were not liable if
in fact authorized to bind the church. Wilson v. Clinton Chapel Afr. M. E.
Zion Church (1917, Tenn.) I98 S. W. 244. See COMMENTS, p. 686.
BILLS AND NOTES-NoTE SIGNED IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPAciT-ExTRiNsic
EVIDENCE OF INTENTION.-The defendants, in fact trustees of a church and
authorized to bind the church, gave a note to the plaintiff, reading "we promise
to pay," etc., and signed by the defendants in their own names, with the word
"trustee" after each name. There was nothing else on the face of the
instrument to indicate that it was other than the personal note of the signers.
The plaintiff sued the defendants personally on the note. Held, that under
the Negotiable Instruments Law the defendants were entitled to show by
extrinsic evidence, as a defense against personal liability, that the note was given
and accepted as the note of the church, and not of the individual signers. G. C.
Riordan & Co. v. Thornsbury (1917, Ky.) 198 S. W. 920. See COMMENTS, p. 686.
CARRIERS-REASoNABLE REGULATIONS AS TO PASSENGERS-"LADIES FIRST."--
A special car belonging to the defendant stopped in front of a crowd of factory
hands. An inspector of the defendant, ,who was in charge of the car, stood at
the steps and directed that women should be allowed to 'get on first The
plaintiff disobeyed this direction and mounted the steps, whereupon the inspector'
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kicked him off. Held, that the order of the inspector was a reasonable regula-
tion, and that in the absence of unnecessary violence the plaintiff had no right
to damages. Garricott v. New York State Rys. (Feb. 26, I918, N. Y.) 9
Rochester-Syracuse Daily Record, No. 55.
The women in this case, having presented themselves for carriage, had become
passengers and were entitled to protection by the carrier. Davey v. Greenfield,
etc. Ry. Co. (19oo) I77 Mass. io6, 58 N. E. x72. A carrier has power to make
binding regulations in regard to the admission of passengers to its cars, pro-
vided such regulations are reasonable. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. Carr
(1889) 71 Md. 135, 17 At. io52. The question of reasonableness is sometimes
treated as one of fact for the jury. Morris, etc. R. R. Co. v. Ayres (1862)
29 N. J. L. 393. In New York, however, it is for the court to determine. Ved-
der v. Fellows (1859) 2o N. Y. i26; Avery v. New York Central, etc. R. R. Co.
(189o) 121 N. Y. 31, 24 N. E. 2o. The fact that in the principal case the regu-
lation was made by a subordinate official does not invalidate it. Commonwealth
v. Power (I844, Mass.) 7 Metc. 596 (superintendent of depot). Nor should
the fact that it was made for a special occasion only. Regulations separating
passengers according to sex and giving special privileges to women have often
been sustained. Peck v. New York Central, etc. R. R. Co. (1877) 7o N. Y.
587; Bass v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. (1874) 36 Wis. 450. In the present case
the court holds that the inspector's order "Ladies first" was reasonable, because
"in the struggling and pushing crowd, women were at a disadvantage in gain-
ing entrance to the car and in protecting themselves." No authorities are cited,
and there is no reference to the recent extension in New York of the voting
franchise to women.
CoNsrIruroNAL LAw-IN rFlsTATE CommaF.RcEc-NwsAPFS CONTAINING
CIGARETTE ADVERTISEMENTs.-A Kansas statute made it unlawful for any
person to sell, give away, or advertise cigarettes in Kansas (Kan. Laws, 1917,
ch. 166, secs. I and 2). The plaintiff, a Missouri corporation, published in
Missouri a newspaper which was distributed throughout Kansas by mail and
otherwise, containing advertisements of cigarettes made and kept for sale out-
side of Kansas. Held, that interference under authority of the state statute
with this distribution was unconstitutional and would be enjoined. Post Print-
ing and Pub. Co. v. Brewster (1917, D. Kan.) 246 Fed. 321.
Tobacco and cigarettes are of course articles of interstate commerce and as
such have been held to be protected from state statutes regulating their impor-
tation. McGregor v. Cone (1898) 1O4 Ia. 465, 73 N. W. io4i; Austin v.
Tennessee (19oo) 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct 132. And there is no federal
legislation to remove or lessen this protection, as is done in the case of intoxi-
cating liquors by the Wilson and the Webb-Kenyon Acts (26 U. S. St at L.
313; 37 U. S. St at L. 699). In holding that newspapers also are subjects of
interstate commerce, within the constitutional provision relating to such com-
merce, the principal case follows Preston v. Finley (i896, C. C. W. D. Tex.)
72 Fed. 85o. And on principle the delivery to subscribers within a state of
newspapers published in another state would seem to be clearly interstate com-
merce, and as such not in itself a proper subject of state regulation. It would
not follo.w, however, that such newspapers could be used with impunity for the
promotion of objects made unlawful by a valid state law. If, therefore,
the advertisements in the principal case had related to cigarettes manufactured
or sold in Kansas in violation of state law, it would seem that Kansas under
its police power could prohibit the circulation of such advertisements, whether
printed in the state or brought in from outside, just as it could prohibit the
circulation of libelous or obscene publications or lottery advertisements. If on
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the other hand the newspaper had been published in Kansas, though advertising
cigarettes to be sold in interstate commerce, or if the question had related to
local sales of the newspapers not in original packages, it is possible that the
state police power might have justified the prohibition. Cf. Delarneter v. South
Dakota (i9o7) 2o5 U. S. 93, 27 Sup. Ct 447; State v. . P. Bass Pub. Co.
(i9o8) 1o4 Me. 288, 71 At. 894; State v. Delaye (1915) i93 Ala. Soo, 68 So.
993; State v. Davis (1915, W. Va.) 87 S. E. 262. In the Delameter case, on
the authority of which the other three cases were decided, the Wilson Act
was expressly relied on, and the case is distinguished in the principal case as
depending on the effect of that Act. No doubt the change in national policy
evidenced by the Wilson Act materially influenced the decision in the Delarneter
case, but it is difficult to see how the reasoning in the last part of the opinion,
on which the case finally turned, gained any direct assistance from the Act. In
the principal case, however, since both the distribution of the newspapers to sub-
scribers and the sales of cigarettes which the advertisements tended to promote
were interstate commerce, there was nothing done or contemplated within the
state on which its police power could be exercised without a direct interference
with interstate commerce. This would seem to be the true ground for dis-
tinguishing the Delameter case.
CONTRACTS-INSTALLMENT CONTRAcTs-NoN-PAYMENT OF PRica OF FiRsT
INSTALLMENT AS ENTIRE BREAcH-The plaintiff agreed to sell and deliver to the
defendant certain picture films. One film was to be delivered each month and
payment therefor was to be within thirty days. The defendant failed to make
the first payment on the day, and two days later the plaintiff sued for damages,
alleging the defendant's breach and his own election to terminate the contract.
The trial court found that there was a refusal to pay, unaccompanied by any
repudiation, but there was no finding as to any of the other surrounding cir-
cumstances from which the materiality of the breach could be determined. Held,
that there was no showing of such a breach as justified the plaintiff in renounc-
ing the contract, and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the sum due
and unpaid but not for damages as for an entire breach. Helgar Corp. v. War-
ner's Features, Inc. (1918, N. Y.) 58 N. Y. L. J. 1780.
The case was governed by section 45 of the Uniform Sales Act as adopted in
New York, which provides that "it depends in each case on the terms of the
contract and the circumstances of the case whether the breach of contract is so
material as to justify the injured party in refusing to proceed further and suing
for damages for breach of the entire contract." This makes the question one of
fact to be determined, as it should be, in each case separately on its merits. The
courts have generally, however, attempted to lay down a rule apparently capable
of mechanical application. Thus the English courts have said that mere non-
payment of the price is not vital unless accompanied by repudiation. Freeth v.
Burr (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 2o8; Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor (1884, H.
of L.) 9 App. Cas. 434. The soundness of this rule was seriously doubted by Sir
Frederick Pollock. Wald's Pollock, Contracts (Williston's ed.) 330. In the
United States the courts have generally declared non-payment in such cases to
be always vital, without reference to the circumstances accompanying it, con-
tenting themselves with some such general proposition as "In the contracts of
merchants, time is of essence." See Williston, Sales, sec. 467. In the present
case the court very sensibly disregards such a "general statement," and refuses
to lay down a mechanical rule making failure to pay on time always equivalent
to an entire breach. Upon delivery of the films and the arrival of the day of
payment the buyer became the plaintiff's debtor for the agreed price then paya-
ble. Upon non-payment, the plaintiff has a right to damages caused by the
47
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non-payment. But in the absence of a showing as to the seriousness ofthe damage suffered by him, or as to the probability of further breaches by thedefendant, the plaintiff is not privileged to refuse further deliveries, and has noright to damages based on the assumption of further non-performance by thedefendant. The rule should be the same even where the Sales Act has not been
adopted.
CRIMINAL LAW-INsANITY-EFFCT OF INSANITY AT TIME OF TPJxL.-The
defendant, who was not represented by counsel, was convicted of an assault
with intent to rape. Later a lawyer was secured, who moved for a new trial,alleging that the defendant was insane at the time of trial. The trial courtoffered to submit the question of present insanity to a jury, under a code sectionrelating to insanity supervening after conviction, but declined to hear evidence
to show that the defendant was insane when tried as a ground for granting anew trial on the original indictment. Held, that the trial court should haveheard and considered the evidence, and if it appeared that the defendant wasinsane when tried, should have granted a new trial. Gardner v. State (1917,
Tex.) 198 S. W. 312.
As suggested by the court, reversal of the first trial was warranted by anobjection moie fundamental than that of newly discovered evidence, namely,that the insanity of the appellant avoided the former proceedings. Nor, it wouldseem, does the objection really depend on the fact that he could not beheld to know of his insanity so as to plead it as a defense. It is elemen-
tary that a man cannot legally be tried, or convicted, or sentenced, while in astate of insanity. I Bishop, Criminal Law, sec. 396; i Wharton, Criminal Law,sec. 58 et seq. Where the question of present insanity is raised before trial,
the usual procedure is to present the question to the trial jury. Frith's Case(i79o) 22 How. St. Tr. 3o7. But other procedure may be adopted in the discre-
tion of the court See Freeman v. People (1847, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 4 Den. 9. Itis for the court to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant sub-mission of the question to the jury. Spann v. State (1872) 47 Ga. 549. And thedetermination of this question is not reviewable on appeal. Webber v. Common-
wealth (1888) 119 Pa. 223. The question of present insanity may be raised atany stage of the trial, and the court must receive any evidence offered but maydispose of the issue as it sees fit. State v. Reed (i889) 41 La. Ann. 581. The
approved course seems to be to submit the special issue with the general issueto the jury. The instant case is novel in that it appears to be the first in whichthe question of insanity at the time of trial was not raised until later. Butthere are cases holding that where it appears after trial that the defendantwas deaf and dumb, or intoxicated, and therefore incapable of understanding
the proceedings, the trial will be set aside. Regina v. Berry (1876, Cr. Cas.
Res.) I Q. B. D. 447; Taffe v. State (i861) 23 Ark. 34.
DAMAGEs-BREACH OF CONTRACT-DAMAGES RESULTING FRo DEATH OFWirx.-In consideration of one dollar deducted monthly from the plaintiff's
wages, the defendant company agreed to provide him and his family withmedical attention. The plaintiff's wife having become ill, the plaintiff sent forthe company's doctor. He refused to attend her. The plaintiff brought anaction for breach of contract, and, alleging that he could not afford to engage
another doctor, claimed damages for the death of his wife. Held, on demurrer,that the plaintiff had a cause of action. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp.
(1917, S. C) 94 S. E. 15.
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A husband has by the common law a legal right to the society and services
of his wife. Schouler, Husband and Wife, sec. 143. He may maintain an
action for an injury to this right. Kelly v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co.
(x897) 168 Mass. 308, 46 N. E. io63; Birmingham Southern Ry. Co. v. Lintner
(1904) 14. Ala. 420, 38 So. 363. The husband's right to recover 
for loss of
consortium has been denied, however, since the enactment of legislation enlarg-
ing the rights of married women. Bolger v. Boston El. Ry. Co. (i9io)
2o5 Mass. 42o, 91 N. E. 389. But the common law right of recovery was
always limited to damages accruing before the wife's death. Baker v. Bol-
ton (i808, N. P.) i Camp. 493. In the absence of statute, damages resulting
solely from the death are not an element of recovery. Hyatt v. Adams (1867)
16 Mich. iSo; Covington Street Ry. Co. v. Packer (1872, Ky.) 9 Bush, 455.
The English courts have qualified this general rule and have held that where
the conduct of the tort-feasor resulting in the death of the plaintiff's wife con-
stitutes also a breach of a contract duty to the husband, and the death is not
therefore an essential part of his cause of action, damages resulting from the
death will be permitted as an element of recovery. Jackson v. Watson (C. A.)
[igo9] 2 K. B. 193. The American authorities, however, are opposed to such a
distinction, and hold that the general rule is as well applicable to actions of con-
tract as to actions of tort Sheerlag v. Kelley (19o8) 2oo Mass. 232, 86 N. E.
293; Duncan v. St. Luke's Hospital (19o6) 113 App. Div. 68, 98 N. Y. Supp.
867, affirmed 192 N. Y. 58o, 85 N. E. iiog. The principal case was an action
on the contract. It would seem, therefore, that although there did exist in
favor of the husband a cause of action, his damages, according to the American
authorities, were merely nominal, unless it should appear that actual damages
were suffered prior to the wife's death.
Dms- DELVERY IN EscRow- REVOcATION - STATUTE OF FRAUDs. - The
plaintiffs entered into an oral agreement to exchange land with the defendants,
M. and P. Both deeds were to be deposited with the other defendant, an
attorney, who was to deliver the deeds to the respective grantees after examin-
ing titles. M. and P. did so deposit their deed, but later instructed the attorney
not to deliver it. The plaintiffs' deed was not deposited until after this instruc-
tion had been given. The plaintiffs sued to compel a delivery. Held, that as
there was no written contract or memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds,
the depositary in escrow could not be compelled to deliver the deed. McLain v.
Healy (1i7, Wash.) x68 Pac. i.
The rule announced in the principal case, which practically overrules the case
of Manning v. Foster (i9o8) 49 Wash. 54i, 96 Pac. 233, and follows a still
earlier case, makes clear the position of the state of Washington on this point.
This view has been supported by text-books and by a few recent cases. i
Devlin, Deeds (3d ed.) sec. 313; Campbell v. Thomas (1877) 42 Wis. 437;
Clark v. Campbell (i9oi) 23 Utah 56g, 65 Pac. 496; Holland v. McCarthy (1916)
173 Cal. 597, i6o Pac. io6g. Though rules concerning delivery in escrow were
developed at an early date in our law, there was no suggestion of this rule
until the case of Fitch v. Bunch (i866) 30 Cal. 208. It is apparently based
upon the idea that the rights and powers created by a deposit in escrow depend
wholly upon contract. See Campbell v. Thomas, supra. Such a rule puts an
unfortunate limitation upon the utility of the conditional delivery of con-
veyances. In many cases, at least, it is the intention in a delivery in escrow,
and is essential to its purpose, that it be irrevocable. Fine v. Lasater (x913)
iio Ark. 425, i6r S. W. 1147. Indeed, it is the very nature of an escrow that,
as to the grantori the transaction is entirely executed. The delivery of a deed
in escrow creates in the grantee of the deed a legal power to obtain title to
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the realty by mere performance of the condition of the escrow. (1913) 23 YALE
LAw JouRNAL, 33; and see Farley v. Palmer (187o) 2o Oh. St 223, 225. Ifthis is the correct analysis of the nature of an escrow it is apparent that the
section of the Statute of Frauds relating to contracts has no application. If theStatute applies at all it must be by virtue of the section which relates to the con-veyance of interests in land. The physical act of handing over a deed, either tothe grantee or to a third person, may always be explained by oral testimonyto show whether or not intended as a "delivery" at all. Why not, then, to showwhether it was a conditional or an unconditional delivery? If it appears thatthe grantor by the delivery intended to create a legal power in the grantee toobtain title by performing a condition, that is, intended to create an escrow, whyshould not effect be given to that intent? If the delivery was absolute, thegrantee is vested with all the rights, powers, etc., which make up title; if thedelivery was in escrow, he is vested with the power to acquire title. There seemsno more reason to apply the Statute of Frauds to one conveyance than to theother. The question remains whether a delivery in escrow had in fact taken
place in the principal case. It may be doubted whether the grantor defendantsintended the delivery of their deed to the attorney to operate as an escrow until
the other parties had made a similar delivery. But if they did, it is submitted,effect should have been given to it To require an enforcible executory contractin addition to a conditional delivery goes a long way toward abolishing the
doctrine of escrows. See Tiffany, Conditional Delivery of Deeds (1914) 14
COLUMBiA L. REV. 380, 398 et seq.
EVIDENCE - DYING DECLARATIONS - "MURDEPnE" AS AN ExPRESsIoN OFOPiNION.-In a homicide trial the state offered in evidence the testimony of awitness who swore that the deceased made a dying declaration to the witnessto the effect that the defendant "murdered" him. The trial court admitted theevidence. Held, that this was error as it was a mere expression of opinion bythe dying man involving a conclusion of law. Pilcher v. The State (1917, Ala.)
77 So. 75.
The statement, "He killed me" satisfies the requirements for a dying declara-tion and is admissible everywhere as a statement of a fact Parker v. State
(914) 1o Ala. App. 53, 65 So. go. The fact is the belief of the deceased thathe met his death at the hands of the defendant But when anything beyond
this is involved in the statement some courts exclude it as an expression ofan opinion. Jones v. Commonwealth (1898, Ky.) 46 S. W. 217 ("shot me for
nothing"); State v. Sale (19o2) 19 Ia. I, 92 N. W. 68o (the deceased "was toblame"); Berry v. State (1897) 63 Ark. 382, 38 S. W. 1038 (the whiskey was"poisoned"). A larger number of courts, though with considerable hesitation,have admitted such statements. State v. Lee (1goo) 58 S. C. 335P 36 S. E.706 ("killed me for nothing") ; Gerald v. State (19Oi) 128 Ala. 6, 29 So. 614('killed me for nothing"); Powers v. State (1897) 74 Miss. 777, 21 So. 657("killed me without cause") ; Shenkenberger v. State (19oo) 154 Ind. 630, 57N. E. 519 ("poisoned by my mother-in-law"); State v. Gile (1894) 8 Wash. 12,35 Pac. 417 ("butchered" by the doctors). It is believed that these difficultiesfollow from too close an application of the opinion rule, the object of whichis to require witnesses to place the facts in detail before the jury, leaving the
latter to draw the necessary inferences. Where the declarant is dead it isimpossible to obtain from him any more detailed facts to guide the jury indrawing such inferences. As Professor Wigmore declares, "Some of the rulings,in their pedantic technicality, would be a scandal to any system of evidence sup-posed to be based on reason and common sense." Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1447.From a technical viewpoint the word "murdered" is a conclusion of mixed law
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and fact rather than purely an expression of opinion. Cf. (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JouRNAL, 277. But in popular usage it is at least predominantly a statement of
a fact. The deceased simply meant that he was killed by ,what appeared to be
the deliberate act of the defendant, and his statement should not be interpreted
as an attempt to give a legal opinion with respect to -degrees of homicide. Once
the fact is established that the homicide was the act of the defendant, other
evidence is nearly always available bearing on the issues which determine its
legal classification. Since the statement bears directly on the most fundamental
issue of fact in the case, and the one most difficult to prove by any other
evidence, it seems pure technicality to allow so slight an admixture of anything
but fact to exclude it. In accordance with this view, such a statement was
admitted in State v. Mace (i896) 118 N. C. 1244, 24 S. E. 798. Cf. State v.
Baldwin (189o) 79 Ia. 714, 45 N. W. 297. The principal case seems an unfortu-
nate example of a tendency from which the criminal law is now happily freeing
itself.
FRAUD-MISREPRESENTATION BY SilEmlcE-R sclssioN.-In an action for the
purchase price of a span of mules, the buyer's defense was that he had rescinded
the contract because of the fraud and deceit of the seller. The trial court found
that the plaintiff when he sold the mules refused specifically either to warrant
their soundness or to make any statement as to their 'condition, but told the
defendant to examine them for herself. The defendant's examination failed to
reveal that one of the mules was suffering from a disease which the trial court
deemed a latent and material defect. At the time of the sale the seller knew of
the existence of this disease. Immediately on discovery of the disease the buyer
offered to return the mules to the seller. Held, that the seller was not entitled to
recover the purchase price. Sainonson v. Horswill (1917, S. D.) 164 N. W.
973. See COMMENTS, p. 691.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-MALICE IN FACT AND LAw-CoMPENSATORY AND PUNI-
TIvE DAMAGE.-In an action for libel and slander the trial court made certain
detached statements from which the jury might well have inferred that the
amount of the damage was within the discretion of the jury and was dependent
upon the malice involved. Then the court correctly stated the Connecticut rule
which gives as compensatory damages the equivalent of injuries received, and as
punitive damages the expenses of the suit less taxable costs. Held, that there
was error in the first part of the instructions, as the effect of malice in fact on
compensatory damages should have been expressly limited to the actual effect of
such malice in increasing the plaintiff's suffering. Craney v. Donovan (1917,
Conn.) 1O2 At. 640.
In actions of libel and slander two kinds of malice are recognized, malice in
law and malice in fact. Coleman v. MacLennan (1908) 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac.
281; Sullivan v. MfcCafferty (1917, Me.) 1O2 Atl. 324. Malice in law is a so-
called presumption of law which finds malice in the utterance of the words with-
out legal justification. Tim v. Hawes (1916, N. Y. App. T.) 97 Misc. 30, 16o N.
Y. Supp. io96. This is a confusing fiction which really means that no malice is
required to sustain the action. Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions (1917) 27
YA. E LAW JOuPNAL, 147, 156. If the plaintiff rests his case here, he is entitled
to compensatory damages. Haines v. Schultz (1888, Sup. Ct) 5o N. J. L. 481, I4
At. 488. A majority of the states award punitive damages in case malice in fact,
or actual ill-will, is shown. Cohalan v. New York Press Co. (1914) 212 N. Y.
344, io6 N. E. ii5. In these states the absence of actual malice has been held
inadmissible to affect the amount of compensatory damages. Garrison v. Robin-
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son (igii, Ct Err.) 8i N. J. L. 497, 79 At. 278. But in some states no punitive
damages are allowed, and there actual malice has been admitted, not as a groundfor an arbitrary increase of compensatory damages, but in order to find theexact amount of the damage inflicted, since the plaintiff may in a particular casesuffer greater distress by knowing that the words were spoken maliciously.
Burt v. Advertiser N. Co. (i89i) 154 Mass. 238, 28 N. E. I; see also Odgers,Libel and Slander (5th ed.) 398. This doctrine, if properly safeguarded,-appears sound on principle, but it is open to some practical objections. It isbelieved that in many cases the plaintiff ,would actually suffer less from knowingthat the words were spoken from prejudice and ill-will rather than from soberconviction, and it is likely that in every such case the jury would award reallypunitive damages under the guise of compensation. This objection, however, isless forcible in a state which allows punitive damages, whether or not such
damages are limited as they are in Connecticut, and granting that there is areal relation between malice and the amount of the damage suffered, theprincipal case seems logical in holding, in effect, that this element should notbe excluded in measuring the compensation, merely because a further allowance
may be made by way of punitive damages.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE-CEnMONY INVALID BECAUSE OF ExISTING IMPEDI-MENT-CoMI mo LAw MARRIAGE ON REMOVAL OF IMPEDIMENT.-Believing herprior marriage in Russia to have been invalid, the defendant contracted a second
with the petitioner; early in the course of their fourteen years' cohabitation ashusband and wife, the defendant's first husband died. The second husbandlater sought annulment on the ground that the first marriage had been validand subsisting at the time the second was celebrated. Held, among other rea-
sons for sustaining the second marriage (I) that if the parties entered on themarriage in ignorance of an existing impediment, and cohabitated matrimonially
both before and after the impediment was removed, they in law became husbandand wife at once on its removal; and (2) that even if the second marriagewas meretricious at the start, a new consent to a common law marriage wouldbe found from continued cohabitation and declarations of the parties that theywere husband and wife, after the removal of the impediment Schaffer v.
Krestovnikow (i9i7, N. 3. Ch.) IO2 Atl. 246.
The holding on the first point amounts to a declaration that a common lawmarriage exists under the circumstances stated. The essence of common lawmarriage is an agreement between the parties,-mutual consent in some manner
to the relation of husband and wife. Bishop, Marriage, Div. and Sep. (6th ed.)sec. 218. Habit and repute are only evidence from which such agreement isinferred or presumed. Ibid., sec. 434. In a case like the present the mutualconsent to enter -upon the marriage relation was clearly without effect whengiven: an impediment existed. After the impediment's removal no such consentwas ever expressed, nor is there reason to presume it; persons who believe
themselves married do not consent to enter on marriage. The "continuing con-sent" sometimes spoken of, so far as it means consent to enter on the relation,
is wholly a fiction. To common law marriage, then, if the principal case issound, the only agreemefit necessary is to be-not to become-husband and wife.This is also the necessary result of a previous New Jersey case, in which themarriage was held to become valid on the removal of the impediment, whether
or not the parties knew of the removal. Robinson v. Robinson (I914, Ch.) 83N. J. Eq. I5o, 9o AtI. 311. This view has not always been taken. In Collins v.Voorhees (i8go, Ct Err.) 47 N. J. Eq. 555, 22 At. 1054, the court met theproblem with cold logic: consent to cohabitation which followed a ceremony
could, until something further appeared, be referred only to that ceremony; if
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the ceremony was without effect, there was no marriage. Accord, Cartwright v.
McGown (1887) 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737. In both the cases last cited, how-
ever, one of the parties was lacking in good faith at the outset, and Collins v.
Voorhees has since been distinguished on that ground. Robinson v. Robinson,
supra. But the real ground of the Robinson case, as of the principal case, seems
to be that the ruling consideration is not logic, but a public policy which favors
sustaining marriage whenever possible. This principle has been applied else-
where to cases in which one or even both of the parties knew of the impediment
at the beginning of the cohabitation. Yates v. Houston (1848) 3 Tex. 433, 450;
De Thoren v. Attorney General (1876, H. of L.) i App. Cas. 686; The Bread-
albane Case (1867) L. R. i H. L. Sc. 182. See also dissenting opinion in Collins
v. Voorhees, supra, 47 N. J. Eq. 315, 2o Atl. 676. The holding on the second
point in the principal case indicates a readiness, not perhaps to overrule Collins
v. Voorhees in terms, but practically to abandon the distinction based on good
faith at the outset, by finding a new consent on evidence hardly differing from
that held insufficient in the earlier case. Since society is interested primarily
in the marriage status-in the contract only as a definite entry upon that status-
there seems to be no sound reason why, in states which recognize common law
marriages, consent to be, rather than to become, husband and wife should not in
all cases be sufficient to constitute the relation.
SALES-STATEMENT THAT GoODs HAD BEEN SHIPPED--WHETHER OR NOT A
"WAPuANTY."-The plaintiff sold a carload of apples to the defendant, and
stated in a letter which was held to be a part of the contract that the apples
had been shipped "yesterday." The plaintiff believed this statement to be true,
but in fact the plaintiff's vendors, who were to make the shipment, did not for-
ward the apples to the defendant until the next day. The defendant refused
to accept the apples resting his refusal on the unfounded claim that they did
not come up to the agreed weight In an action for the price the defendant
relied on the fact the apples were not shipped at the time stated. Held, that
the defense must fail, both because the statement in question was made merely
to identify the particular shipment, and the delay was an immaterial variation
which gave no privilege of rejecting the goods, and because, if available at all,
this objection was waived by failure to assert it immediately on learning the
facts. DeHoff v. Aspegren, (1917, App. T.) 166 N. Y. Supp. iO19.
In the case of a charter party a statement in the contract that the ship had
sailed "three weeks ago" has been held to be a warranty and not a mere repre-
sentation. Ollive v. Booker (1847) I Exch. 416; accord, Oppenheim v. Fraser
(1876, Q. B. Div.) 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 524 ("now at Rangoon"). A warranty
has been defined, in effect, as a statement descriptive of the subject-matter or
of some material incident, such as the time or place of shipment, equivalent to
an express condition precedent, so that if found to be untrue in fact, it justifies
the other party in repudiating the entire contract. See Norrington v. Wright.
(1885) 115 U. S. 188, 203; 6 Sup. Ct. 12, 14, and cases above cited. Whether
such a statement is to be regarded as a warranty or a mere representation is
treated as a question of construction, depending on the court's judgment of the
materiality of the statement. In cases involving so-called "implied conditions"
it is generally declared that time is presumptively of the essence in all mercantile
contracts. See for example Norrington v. Wright, supra; Salmon v. Boykin
(1887) 66 Md. 541, 7 At. 70. It is obvious that this rule, followed blindly,
would often produce unjust results. In most of the cases decided under it,
however, the delay was in fact substantial and serious; and it is to be hoped
that the law will eventually reject the artificial theory of implied "conditions"
where no condition is expressed, and treat the defense as depending simply on
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the seriousness of the breach. See Williston, Sales, sec. 453, and compare the
discussion of Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features, Inc. (1918, N. Y.) 58 N.
Y. L. J. 1780, on page 697 of this number. But such an equitable doctrine is
hardly applicable to the case of express conditions. The intent should there-
fore be very clear before an ambiguous phrase is construed as equivalent to
such a condition. Indeed since the notion of a "warranty" as virtually amount-
ing to an express condition has been chiefly confined to insurance and maritime
contracts, the courts might well decline to extend it any further. The result
in the principal case is therefore to be commended, though the decision would
be more satisfactory had it been rested squarely on the first ground.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE AND TRANSFER TAXES-SHAREHOLDERS' INTEREST IN
MASSACHusETTs BusiNEss TRus.-The testator died domiciled in Massa-
chusetts; part of the estate consisted of shares in a business trust whose
trustees were also domiciled there; the trust property was a factory and
materials situated in New Hampshire. Objection was made to the assess-
ment of the Massachusetts succession tax on so much of the shares "as
constituted an equitable interest in foreign real estate." Held, that where the
trust fund was ultimately to be converted into personalty for distribution, and
where it from the beginning consisted of mixed realty and personalty, it must
be treated as converted into personalty from the beginning, so that a succession
tax at the domicile of the decedent shareholder was valid. Dana v. Treasurer
& Recvr. Geni. (1917, Mass.) 116 N. E. 941. See COMMENTS, p. 677.
ToRTS-INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT-ENGAGEMENT TO MARRY.-The
defendants maliciously, and for the purpose of advancing their own pecuniary
interests, induced the plaintiff's fianc6 to break his engagement with her. Held,
that these facts gave the plaintiff no right of action. Homan v. Hall (I917,
Neb.) 165 N. W. 881.
Authorities in point are scarce and unsatisfactory. The court relies chiefly
on a passage in Cooley, which in turn cites no authority. Cooley, Torts (2d ed.)
277. The leading case for the doctrine that inducing a breach of contract may
constitute a tort is Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 E. & B. 216. There are
dicta in English cases, containing elaborate discussions of this doctrine, which
ridicule the idea of recovery in a case like the principal case. Allen v. Flood
(1897, H. of L.) [1898] A. C. I, 35; Glamorgan Coat Co. v. South Wales Miners'
Federation (C. A.) [1903] 2 K B. 545, 577; National Phonograph Co. v.
Edison Bell Cons. Phonograph Co. (i9o6, Ch. D.) [i9o8] i Ch. 335, 350.
Finally, there is an American case denying recovery, which also based its
decision on the passage in Cooley. Leonard v. Whetstone (1903) 34 Ind. App.
383, 68 N. E. 197. The doctrine of Lunley v. Gye has been accepted by the
United States Supreme Court and by most of our states, with some statutory
modifications. Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, etc., Ry. Co. (1893) I5I U. S. I, 14
Sup. Ct 24o, and cases collected in note, Ann. Cas. 1916 E. 6o8. At first the doc-
trine ,was applied only to labor contracts, but the present tendency is to extend its
scope. Moody v. Perley (1915, N. H.) 95 Atl. 1O47. With reference to actions
for interfering with engagements of marriage, it is submitted that there is room
for analysis and differentiation with regard to the motives of the defendant and
the relationship between the persons concerned. The allowance of the action
must ultimately rest on considerations of policy. While it is conceivable that
recovery against parents or near relatives acting in good faith from disinterested
motives ought to be denied on the ground of privilege, it is difficult to see why
recovery should not be allowed against persons standing in no such relation and
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actuated by malice or self-interest. Compare the discussion of privilege and
motive in tort actions in (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 263.
TRUSTS-RESULTING TRuSTS-INDIRECT PARTIAL PAYMENT BY WIFE FOR LAND
CONVEYED To HUSBAND.-The defendant wife inherited from her father a specific
portion of an estate. She did not actually receive the land, but the value
thereof was credited to her husband on a purchase of land from the estate by
him and in his name. Held, that there was a resulting trust in the land in
favor of the wife for a proportionate undivided interest Hinshaw v. Russell
(917) 280 Ill. 235, 117 N. E. 4o6.
The general rule is that where two or more pay the consideration and the
conveyance is taken in the name of only one, a resulting trust is created in
favor of the others pro tanto. Barrows v. Bohan (1874) 41 Conn. 278; Moul-
trie v. Wright (i9o8) I54 Cal. 520, 98 Pac. 257; 1 Perry, Trusts (6th ed.) sec.
i26. Though the wife paid no money actually in the principal case, the analogy
seems close enough to warrant the extension of the general rule to such cases.
As regards the relationship, there is a presumption of a gift ,where one pays for
a conveyance to another whom he is under a duty to support. Dyer v. Dyer
(1788, Exch.) 2 Cox Ch. 92; Bailey v. Dobbins (i9o3) 67 Neb. 548, 93 N. W.
687. But where the conveyance is to the husband and payment is made by the
wife, this presumption does not apply. Silling v. Todd (Ig1) 112 Va. 802, 72
S. E. 682; In re Mahin's Estate (1913) i6r Ia. 459, 143 N. W. 42o. While the
conclusion in the principal case seems sound, the language of the opinion leaves
much to be desired. For example, the court quotes with apparent approval:
"This trust arises, not from a contract or agreement of the parties, but from
their acts," and "Its very name implies that it is independent of any contract,
and is raised by the law itself upon a particular state of facts." Strictly speak-
ing a resulting trust of the kind under consideration is based upon a presumption
that the one furnishing the consideration for the conveyance intended that the
property should be held for him. This presumption may be rebutted by
evidence showing that this was not the intention. H. F. Stone, Resulting Trusts
and the Statute of Frauds (i9o6) 6 COLUMBIA L. REV. 326, 330. Much confusion
has proceeded from a failure to distinguish clearly between such trusts, based
on assumed intention, and constructive trusts, created by the law regardless of
intention. The principal case helps little to clear up this confusion.
WILLS-IcORoRATION BY REFERENCE-PREVENTING LAPSE OF POWER OF
APPOINTMENT BY INcORPORATING DoNEE!s WILL-The testator's will gave his
wife a power of appointment and provided that in case they should die in a com-
mon disaster his will should be construed on the assumption that she survived
him. The wife executed a will at the same time, attempting to exercise the
power. Husband and wife were lost at sea with the Lusitania. Held, that the
property passed under the husband's -vill to the person in whose favor the wife
had attempted to exercise the power, her will being incorporated by reference
into his. Crane, McLaughlin and Cuddeback, JJ., dissenting. In re Fowles'
Will (1918, N. Y.) 118 N. E. 6II. See COMMENTS, p. 673.
WILLs-LEGACIES CONDITIONED ON NOT CONTESTING WILL-WAIVER OF FoR-
FEITIuE.-A will created a trust for the testator's children and directed that if
any child should contest the probate or operation of the will, the provision for
such child should be void and his share should pass to the other children. All
the children appealed from the order of probate on the ground that the testator
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was of unsound mind. Later they abandoned this contention and stipulated that
the only question to be decided was one concerning the construction of a certain
part of the will. In a later suit by the trustee to obtain a declaration of the
validity of the trust and a construction of the will, the children requested that
the trust be carried out. Held, that in the absence of evidence of probable cause
for the contest the beneficial provisions for the children were forfeited, that such
forfeiture could not be waived, and that the property in the hands of the trustee
must be distributed as intestate estate South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John
(917) 92 Conn. 168, loi At. 961.
Testators frequently try to prevent litigation by directing a forfeiture of the
interest of any beneficiary who shall contest the will. The validity of such a
provision appears not to have been previously determined in Connecticut Nor
are the authorities elsewhere very numerous or entirely consistent Rood, Wills,
secs. 616-622. Generally American courts have enforced such conditions with-
out regard to whether there is a gift over of the forfeited legacy or devise.
Estate of Hite (1909) 155 Cal. 436, 1i Pac. 443; but see Matter of Wall (1912,
N. Y. Surr.) 76 Misc. lo6, 136 N. Y. Supp. 452. Of course a suit to obtain
a construction of the will does not violate the ordinary forfeiture clause. Black
v. Herring (1894) 79 Md. 146, 28 Atl. io63. But a contest as to testamentary
capacity, undue influence, or the formal execution of the.will clearly falls within
the literal terms of the condition. Nevertheless a substantial conflict of
authority exists vhether a forfeiture should be enforced when such contest is
carried on in good faith and on reasonable grounds. The principal case adopts
the argument that to give effect to the condition under such circumstances would
tend to intrench fraud and undue influence, and would be contrary to a sound
public policy. Friend's Estate (904) 209 Pa. St 442, 58 Atl. 853, 68 L. R. A.
447, accord; Estate of Miller (19o9) 156 Cal. ii9, io3 Pac. 842, contra. But
as the record contained no evidence whether the contest was begun in good
faith and with probable cause, the actual decision was in favor of forfeiture. In
holding further that such forfeiture could not be waived, the court expressly
refused to follow a Tennessee decision directly in point Willianis v. Williams
(1885, Tenn.) i5 Lea, 438. No other case has been found raising precisely this
question.
It may be suggested, however, that not only on the question of waiver, but
with regard to the effect of the forfeiture clause itself, the case called for further
analysis. The question of waiver would seem to depend on whether the pro-
vision for forfeiture is to be construed as a common law condition subsequent,
like a condition for re-entry, which would require some action on the part of
the testator's heirs to enforce the forfeiture, and hence, it would seem, could be
waived, or as a limitation on the estate created which, if it took effect at all,
would be self-executing. In the principal case the language of the forfeiture
provision seems most consistent with a limitation attached to each child's share
by way of executory devise to the other children. But the evident general
intent of the testator would require that if more than one child contested the
will, each one so contesting should not only forfeit his original interest, but
should be excluded from any share in the executory devise. What is to happen,
then, when all the children join in the contest? Failure of an executory devise
does not necessarily mean that the prior estate continues. Doe v. Eyre (1848,
Exch. Ch.) 5 C. B. 713; Robinson v. Wood (1858) 27 L. J. Ch. 726; O'Mahoney
v. Burdett (1874) L. R. 7 H. L. 388. Where the property is realty and the prior
estate is in fee, the doctrine supported by the authorities just cited is perhaps
open to criticism, but in other cases there seems no reason to doubt that the
testator could make a limitation by which the interests first given would be ipso
facto terminated by the happening of the condition, whether or not the gift over
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could take effect. See Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) secs. 250, 78. This was in
substance, if not in terms, the construction adopted by the Connecticut court.
The result, however, was to give to the children as heirs, in fee simple and free
of any trust or future limitation, the same property which they had forfeited
as equitable legatees subject to gifts over on failure of issue. It may be con-
ceded that the testator apparently did not consider the possibility of all the
children contesting; but it seems more in accord with his probable general
intent to conclude that the forfeiture was not to take effect unless there was
some child qualified, by refraining from contest, to receive the gift over. It is
suggested that this result could be accomplished, independently of any waiver,
and in strict accord with legal principles, by holding that the estates first given
were to be cut short only by the operation of the executory devises, and that
since an express or implied condition of all the executory devises had failed, the
prior estates continued. Cf. Harrison v. Foreman (i8oo, Ch.) 5 Ves. 2o7; Jack-
son v. Noble (1838, Ch.) 5 Keen 59o; Hodgson v. Halford (1878, Eng. V. C.)
ii Ch. D. 959; Drummond's Ex'r. v. Drummond (1875, Ch.) 26 N. J. Eq. 234.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-CoNFmcT oF LAWs-FoREIGN CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYmENT.-A workman employed in New York for labor within that state
was subsequently sent to work in Connecticut pursuant to a special arrangement
as to wages entered into with his employer at the latter's New York office.
Nothing was said about compensation in case of injury. The workman %was
injured at his work in Connecticut. Held, that the Connecticut Workmen's
Compensation Act was applicable. Banks v. Albert D. Howlett Co. (1918,
Conn.) io2 Ati. 822.
This case presents a complication of two vexed questions, both of which
would be avoided under the tort rule of construction of workmen's compensa-
tion acts, adopted in Gould's Case (I913) 2r5 Mass. 480, io2a N. E. 693. The
first relates to the rule applicable to a contract where a place of performance
distinct from the place of making is contemplated. In applying the rule of the
place of performance, the principal case follo.ws the established Connecticut
doctrine. Chillingworth v. Eastern etc. Co. (I895) 66 Conn. 366, 33 At. ioop.
The second question involves the choice between .two possibly applicable com-
pensation statutes, where an employment transcends state lines. In those juris-
dictions where the contract theory of these statutes is adopted, the authorities
are uniform in applying the statute of the forum to extra-territorial injuries
arising under domestic contracts. Post v. Burger (1916) 216 N. Y. 544, 1i1 N.
E. 351;Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co. (915) 89 Conn. 367, 94 AtI. 372;
Rounsaville v. Central Ry. Co. (915, Sup. Ct) 87 N. J. L. 371, 94 AtI. 392;
Grinnell v. Wilkinson (1916, R. I.) 98 Atl. io6. The inverse case of local
injuries arising under foreign contracts has given rise to three divergent lines
of decisions. Sometimes the lex loci contractus has been consistently held to
govern, and the foreign statute applied. Schweitzer v. Hamburg-American Line
(1912, N. Y. Trial T.) 78 Misc. 448, 138 N. Y. Supp. 944. See Kennerson v.
Thames Towboat Co., supra. In one state it is held that the sending of the
employee across state lines without dissent expressed pursuant to the terms
of the compensation act of the new place of employment, creates a new con-
tractual or quasi-contractual relationship, governed by the law of the latter place.
American Radiator Co. v. Rogge (1914, Sup. Ct) 86 N. 3. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85, 94
Atl. 85. Other courts, while admitting that the foreign statute would be con-
trolling if applicable, have resorted to the theory last mentioned, when the lex
loci contractus happened not to possess an applicable statute. Douthwright v.
Champlin (917) 9i Conn. 524, ioo Atl. 97. By basing its decision on the
finding of a real novation at the beginning of the work in Connecticut, the
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principal case consistently adheres to the contract theory of its Compensation
Act. Its intimation that the conclusion reached must be limited to such a
situation of fact appears to involve a repudiation of American Radiator Co. v.
Rogge, supra, which nevertheless is cited in the opinion with apparent approval.
It also leaves Douthwright v. Champlin, supra, little ground for support. Mani-
festly the absence of a statute applicable to the contract in its inception has no
tendency to show an intention to assume a new contractual relationship from
the mere transit across state lines. To ascribe such a result is of course merely
a verbal subterfuge for a plain switch to the tort theory of the local act If the
failure to express dissent from the latter is an expression of assent to its provi-
sions, this can follow only from the already established premise that the act
is applicable to all employment, irrespective of origin, within the limits of the
state. Such applicability, however, can be established only on the theory that
the statute enunciates a rule of policy applicable territorially after the manner
of the law of torts. For a discussion of Douthwright v. Champlin, supra, see
(1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 113.
WORiMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJuRY DUE To T HmI PERSON'S FAULT-
SUBROGATION OF EMPLOYER TO RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEE.-An employee sustained an
injury in the course of his employment due to the negligence of one not his
employer. He filed a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, accom-
panied, as required by the Act, by an assignment of any claims against third
persons. After allowance of his claim but before payment of the award, he
brought this action against the third person responsible for the injury. While
the action was pending, the defendant, through the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, settled with the employer under the assignment Thereafter the
plaintiff applied to the Commission to withdraw his claim against the employer,
and was allowed to do so. Held, that the assignment became effective when
executed, and even if it could be avoided by withdrawal of the claim without
the employer's consent, the defendant, having paid the assignee while the assign-
ment was in effect, was protected by such payment against further liability.
Sabatino v. Crimmins Const. Co. (1918, N. Y. Trial T.) 168 N. Y. Supp. 495.
Except in a few states, the statutory right to compensation given to an injured
employee by the workmen's compensation acts does not in itself either impair
or add to his common law rights against third persons. Lester v. Otis Elevator
Co. (1915, N. Y.) 169 App. Div. 613, 155 N. Y. Supp. 524. He has an election
of remedies, but having chosen one, cannot assert the other. Turnquist v. Han-
non (1914) 219 Mass. 560, 563; io7 N. E. 443, 444; Miller v. New York Ry. Co.
(1916, N. Y.) 171 App. Div. 316, 157 N. Y. Supp. 200; but see Houlihan v.
Sulzberger & Sons Co. (1917, ID) i18 N. E. 429. And where he has elected
to proceed against the employer, the latter has not, in the absence of express
statutory provision, any recourse against the real tort-feasor. Inter-State Tel.
Co. v. Public Service Elec. Co. (1914, Sup. Ct) 86 N. J. L. 26, go At. io62. In
New York and a few other states there are express provisions by which an
employer who is compelled to pay is allowed recourse against the person actually
at fault. See Sandek v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Lt. Co. (1916) 163 Wis. lO9,
157 N. W. 579; Grand Rapids Lumber Co. v. Blair (I916) igo Mich. 518, 157
N. W. 29; Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller (1917, C. C. A. 8th) 24o Fed. 376. The
time when this statutory right becomes fixed in the employer depends, of
course, on the differing phraseology of the statutes. The decision in the
principal case seems a sound construction of the statute governing the case. A
subsequent amendment has dispensed with the requirement of an assignment
executed by the claimant, providing that "the awarding of compensation shall
operate as an assignment of the cause of action." The statutes of a few other
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states go still further. The Illinois act, for example, in cases where all parties
have accepted the act, limits the employee to his claim for compensation against
the employer, transferring to the latter, without any election by the employee, the
common law rights of the employee against third persons, to the extent neces-
sary to reimburse the employer. For a recent case construing and upholding
these provisions, see Friebel v. Chicago City Ry. Co. <I917, Ill.) I7 N. E. 467.
See also Matheson v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. (914) 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W.
71, accord, and cf. Peet v. Mills (93) 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685.
